© 2017 Thermidor Magazine.

Designed by Jonathan.

Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Ideology And The Making Of Modern Taiwan

Despite the popular image of a dualistic life and death struggle between Communism and Capitalism in China, one the of many paradoxes in this scenario has been the relatively good press that Mao received in “running dog” USA, and other Western states, compared with that of Chiang Kai-shek. In the USA influential academics and journalists had promoted Mao as the preference to Chiang Kai-shek. The much-maligned Senator Joseph McCarthy documented this in a book, America’s Retreat from Victory: The Story of General George Cartlett Marshall, 1 Marshall famously having “disarmed” Chiang at crucial moment in the civil war with the Red Army. In particular, there is also John T Flynn’s While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and who made it. 2 Chang and Halliday comment that “it was no secret that many US officials were decidedly unenthusiastic about Chiang”. Marshall was particularly “ill-disposed” towards Mao, and maintained that Mao was a good democrat. Marshall saved the Red Army from obliteration in 1946 by threatening Chiang if he did not stop pursuing the Reds into northern Manchuria. This was decisive, and allowed the Reds a safe base from which to recover. 3

Did the USA prefer a Maoist victory to that maintenance of Chiang’s Kuomintang regime? As indicated, Chiang was not favoured by the USA. Chiang was aware of forces against him that were other than the Communists. Gen. Sun Li-jen, who fought with the Americans against the Japanese in Burma and afterwards against the Red Army in Manchuria, until that was thwarted by the USA, was regarded by Chiang as working against him with U.S. support. On Taiwan Gen. Sun was chief of staff (1954-1955), but in 1955 he was placed under house arrest, accused of plotting a coup with other officers. Gen. Sun was not released until 1988, as was a 1955 report which cleared him. 4 It is unknown why there was such a delay between the death of Chiang and Gen. Sun’s exoneration. Yet in 1955 there was also a CIA report that mentioned Gen. Sun as telling the American chargé in Taiwan that he expected to be arrested in regard to an army plot to organize a mass demonstration at a presidential review. The CIA report refers to Gen. Sun as having been critical of Chiang’s policies, and approvingly implies that he is a center of leadership for disaffection among young army officers should they attempt a coup in future. 5 The CIA position had been that Chiang would be ousted by Mao by mid-1950. With the Korean War, the USA sent the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. While it is conventionally claimed that this was to protect Taiwan from invasion from the Mainland, a contention among conservative Americans had long been that it ensured that the formidable KMT army would not be able to attack the Mainland. This intuition is subsequently supported by documents that were declassified in 1993, stating that it was only when Mao sent forces to Korea that the USA decided to support Taiwan, the intention having hitherto been to abandon Chiang. The Los Angeles Times posed the question:

“What might have happened to Taiwan without the Korean War is one of the fascinating what-ifs in the history of America’s Cold War relations with Asia. Would the United States have forged a good working relationship with China in 1950, more than two decades earlier than it did, perhaps producing an early split between Mao’s Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union?” 6

The USA was about to grant recognition to Mao, according to Georgetown University historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, who wrote that “by early 1950, on the eve of the Korean War, Truman and Acheson were preparing to grant diplomatic recognition to Beijing--a move that the war and its aftermath postponed until 1978. ‘As Taiwan’s fall neared, the State Department moved to eliminate other obstacles to recognition,’ Tucker wrote in her book, Patterns in the Dust”. 7

An alternative scenario, which also involved the ousting of Chiang, was to support a coup led by Gen. Sun in 1950: “A leading Korean War historian, Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago, recently concluded that in the weeks just before shooting broke out, some U.S. policy-makers and intelligence operatives were trying to engineer a coup against Chiang’s Taiwan government by a Nationalist general, Sun Li-jen.” 8 It seems that Chiang was correct in being suspicious of Gen. Sun and the involvement of the CIA behind a 1955 plot. The CIA had apparently selected Gen. Sun, having been mentored from an early age by the USA, to replace Chiang as a pliable tool.

Was there a long-range dialectic involved? The globalist think tanks the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission have played primary roles in the economic relations that have flourished between global corporations and China since the “ping-pong diplomacy” of the 1970s. 9 The Asia Society was formed long ago by the Rockefeller dynasty that has had a particular interest in China. The recently deceased David Rockefeller’s oil and banking corporations were the first into China following the diplomatic relations that had been facilitated by Henry Kissinger and other Rockefeller confidantes. David returned from a trip to China most enthused by the Maoist regime.

Were there issues with Chiang and the Kuomintang party that U.S. globalist interests considered more a hindrance in the long term, to their aims for China, than the prospect of a Maoist victory? Both journalism and academia not only in China but also in the USA have portrayed Chiang and the Kuomintang as inherently subservient to the USA and to capitalism. However, seldom is the ideology of Chiang and the Nationalist party considered in making these assumptions. So far from being a tool of foreign capital, and the concomitant decadence and corruption that goes with it, Chiang attempted to weld the Kuomintang and later his regime on Taiwan into a bulwark of national renewal that included a rejection of liberal decadence and of capitalist economics in favour of a command economy. The Kuomintang was a genuine national-revolutionary movement. For much of its formative years it was under the leadership of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), an early supporter of Sun Yat-sen, who appointed him leader of the Kuomintang (KMT) National Revolutionary Army in1924. Chiang defeated the war lords and assumed the conflict with both the Japanese and the Communists. With years of war, only a fraction of the weary Nationalist forces followed Chiang to Taiwan in 1949. There the transition from Japanese domination to the KMT involved further prolonged tensions and struggles, as efforts were made to transform the economy in ways that were resented by many native Taiwanese.

Repudiation of Foreign Degeneracy

The Chinese have a cyclical conception of history that might be described as “wheels within wheels” rather than as the “great wheel” of Buddhism and Hinduism. They see the history of China, which it so say, the history on which the world hinges (since the Chinese emperor is the sole universal ruler with the Mandate from Heaven), as being the rise and fall of dynasties. When a dynasty decays it does so because the Emperor has broken the nexus between himself and the Divine. It has become morally bankrupt. 10

Chiang was particularly concerned with the moral degradation of China by foreign influences. The mission of the Kuomintang was to morally revive China. He saw the contagion of decay being carried not only by Marxism, but by Western merchants and the presence of the foreign concessions was particularly troubling to him. Chiang wrote of this decadence:

“A survey of our long history of five thousand years reveals the alternate rise and fall of states and the survival and extinction of nations. Yet the national decay during the last hundred years reached a point unequalled in our history. The state and the nation became weakened and encountered inner crises in the political, economic, social, ethical, and psychological spheres, until the basis of rebirth and recovery was almost destroyed”. 11

The Nationalist Revolution realised that liberalism and internationalism were then, as they remain today behind the guise of “globalisation” and “human rights”, the means by which a healthy state is brought to decay for the purposes of conquest. The commercial spirit, traditionally the most subordinated of activities in China, now became dominant among the Chinese themselves. Chiang alludes to the moral and ethical shift resulting physical deterioration:

“The steady deterioration of the people’s virtue affected their physical condition, causing them to grow weaker day by day. The physical strength of the countless numbers of unemployed in the cities was, of course, completely exhausted, and as the merchants and ordinary people became accustomed to a life of luxury and dissipation, their health also deteriorated. The most serious danger was the threat to the health of the youth in the schools. Physical training could not include the entire student body, and ethical training had long been neglected by the principals and teachers. A life of luxury and dissipation outside the schools lured the youth and caused them to become physically weak and mentally decadent, while contagious diseases and syphilis from the cities further undermined their health. How could these physically and mentally weakened youths, after leaving school, promote scholarship, or reform the people’s way of life so that they could assume the responsibilities of the state and develop social enterprises? It was indeed impossible to predict when this degeneration of the state and decline of the nation would end”. 12

The decay of China followed the same rhythm as other Civilizations. Wealth drained the stamina of some classes through luxurious decadence, while the great mass of the rest of society could not secure the basics of life, and deteriorated from that end. The youth of the leadership classes became too dissipated to assume their leadership responsibilities. The great achievements of Chinese Civilisation had endured for millennia, with dynastic ups and downs, and had managed to absorb foreign influences for the advancement of learning on their own terms, as have the Jews and Japanese; genuine “cultural enrichment” through careful adaptation. The Chinese had rejected all foreign blandishments of commerce if this would infect the Chinese culture organism for the sake of trade. The subordination of commerce as a conscious policy enabled the Chinese to defend their Civilisation longer than any others. Chiang stated of this adaptation:

“… The Chinese nation was still able to absorb and adopt foreign culture and learning for its further advancement. And because China could absorb other forms of civilization, her own civilization became even broader and greater. However, China’s culture and learning have their own ancient standards. China was able to absorb other forms of civilization and learning precisely because she had her own standards and her own system by which to judge these other forms of civilization. Thus, when foreign civilizations were transplanted to China, they became a part of China’s national economy and of the people’s livelihood, and thus could remain indefinitely as part of China’s civilization”. 13

China had however reached an epochal point of balance where foreign culture bodies could poison the culture organism rather than invigorate it. Chiang described this process, enabled by the humiliating imposition of foreign treaties that now subordinated China to commerce. With this opening to foreign trade came foreign doctrines. In prior centuries when Jesuit and Protestant missionaries had entered China, the Chinese eschewed the adoption of Christianity while accepting the Western science that the Jesuits offered. The only way the Jesuits could interact more successfully than other missionaries was to become Sinified in customs, manners and dress. 14 China absorbed Western science without compromising its moral, ethical and spiritual foundations. The 19th century was a different matter. Chiang states of this:

“On the other hand, during the past hundred years, China’s civilization showed signs of great deterioration. This was because, under the oppression of the unequal treaties, the Chinese people reversed their attitude toward Western civilization from one of opposition to one of submission, and their attitude toward their own civilization changed from one of pride to one of self-abasement. Carried to extremes, this attitude of submission [^to Western theories] became one of ardent conversion and they openly proclaimed themselves loyal disciples of this or that foreign theory. Similarly, the attitude of self-abasement was carried to such an extreme that they despised and mocked the heritage of their own civilization. We should bear in mind that from the Opium War down to the Revolution of 1911, the unanimous demand of the people was to avenge the national humiliation and make the country strong, and all efforts were concentrated on enriching the country and strengthening the army. In other words, it was our unwillingness to become slaves that first caused us to study Western civilization. It follows that we should also study Western civilization for the purpose of winning our independence and making China strong. Unfortunately, after the Revolution of 1911, the will to avenge our national humiliation and make the country strong perished with the failure of the Revolution, and the effects of the unequal treaties were further deepened after this failure. Unconsciously, the people developed the habit of ignoring their own traditions and cultivating foreign ways; of respecting foreign theories and despising their native teachings; of depending upon others and blindly following them. … the result was that they unconsciously became the slaves of foreign theories because of their studies of Western civilization”. 15

Repudiation of Liberalism

Foreign ideologies acted like cancers on the cells and organs of the Chinese culture. Chiang cites the two primary examples: Communism and Liberalism, the latter represented in China by the presence of the American Professor John Dewey. Chiang writes:

“…two types of thought individualistic Liberalism and class-war Communism were suddenly introduced among the educated classes and spread throughout the whole country. ... As a result, the educated classes and scholars generally adopted the superficial husks of Western culture and lost their own respect and self-confidence and lost their confidence in Chinese culture. Wherever the influence of these ideas prevailed, the people regarded everything foreign as good and everything Chinese as bad”. 16

Chiang so far from being a lackey of capitalism, saw its Liberal ideology as being as much a foreign and corrupting influence as Communism:

“As for the struggle between Liberalism and Communism, it was merely a reflection of the opposition of Anglo-American theories to those of Soviet Russia. Not only were such political theories unsuited to the national economy and the people’s livelihood, and opposed to the spirit of China’s own civilization, but also the people that promoted them forgot that they were Chinese and that they should study and apply foreign theories for the benefit of China. As a result, their copying only caused the decay and ruin of Chinese civilization, and made it easy for the imperialists to carry on cultural aggression. China’s theoreticians and political leaders, either directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, adopted the theories and interests of the imperialists as their own, and forgot their own origin and the purpose of their study”. 17

The foreign concessions opened up China to not only drugs but to prostitution, gambling, and criminality. Chiang describes how far-reaching the process was, spreading out from the foreign concessions:

“When economic conditions in the interior were poor, the people migrated to the cities. But it was difficult to find employment and they were therefore forced to sell their sons and daughters, and fell into the evil habits of prostitution and kidnaping. Thus, during the past hundred years, beautiful and prosperous cities became hells of misery and chaos. As for gambling, its damage was not limited to the rich, but also spread to the poor. The rich lost their fortunes and went bankrupt, and the poor lost their livelihood and met disaster. Once tainted with the habit of gambling, the social order became completely lawless. The people’s minds were paralyzed and their morality destroyed. Moreover, the practice of gambling was not limited to the gambling dens, but extended from lotteries to speculative activities in the market activities that did not follow the laws of production and exchange, but depended solely on luck to obtain unmerited profits. The concessions became the concentration points for surplus capital, but there were no well-established industries to employ this capital. Consequently, many people, both rich and poor, engaged in gambling, spent money lavishly in houses of prostitution, and became paralyzed with drugs. After having gone bankrupt and broken up their families, they degenerated into thieves and bandits, using the concessions as their hideouts and engaging in all sorts of criminal activities. China’s five-thousand-year-old tradition of diligence, thrift, and simplicity, of cotton clothes and a simple diet, of women weaving and men farming, were completely undermined by the opium, gambling, prostitutes, and thugs of the concessions.” 18

The intricate relationships that form a stable social organism had been the basis of Chinese Civilization, but had reached crisis point. It was the same process that had proceeded with the decline of so many civilizations, including the current epoch of the West.

Youth as Nationalist Cadres

Opulence and poverty each have their debilitating effects. Most detrimental was the health of the youth, whose training in both ethical and physical fields had been neglected.

“A life of luxury and dissipation outside the schools lured the youth and caused them to become physically weak and mentally decadent, while contagious diseases and syphilis from the cities further undermined their health. How could these physically and mentally weakened youths, after leaving school, promote scholarship, or reform the people’s way of life so that they could assume the responsibilities of the state and develop social enterprises? It was indeed impossible to predict when this degeneration of the state and decline of the nation would end.” 19

Adding to the degeneration of youth was the Communist Party. This pathology on the social and cultural organism takes advantage of what it also condemns as bourgeois decadence once it is in power. The Communist Party was able to undermine the Kuomintang by the alliance that had been formed during the 1920s. Chiang alludes to the Communists actively promoting the decadence of youth:

“During this period, the leaders of the Communist Party, such as Ch’en Tu-hsiu, voiced these theories in New Youth, Guidepost, and other publications. They also fomented conflict between the right and left factions within the Kuomintang and encouraged class struggle and social revolution. In accordance with their slogan of the class struggle, they regarded the peasants and workers as the exclusive instruments of the Communist Party and encouraged production stoppages. It is unnecessary to mention the other economic and social losses caused by them. They even regarded students and intellectuals as counter-revolutionaries, while praising as progressive elements those who practiced dissipation and debauchery. They encouraged our youth to despise and abandon the ancient virtues of our nation, and even denounced the virtues of propriety, righteousness, thrift, and humility as reactionary, and treated filial piety, brotherly love, loyalty, and obedience with scorn.” 20

To the youth was a special task, “to undertake work that others dare not undertake and to endure sufferings that others cannot endure; to overcome difficulties and dangers, and become pioneers in frontier and other isolated regions, in order to serve the needs of the state and society and to enrich the life of the state and the nation.” 21 To the nation there would be a unified effort at reconstruction, a social ethos,

“It should be understood that the transformation of social customs and public morale and the practical work of national reconstruction are the most important enterprises in the rehabilitation of the nation, and require constant effort. If a single individual struggles along in isolation, his achievements cannot be great or enduring. Therefore, all adult citizens and ambitious young men in every village, district, province, and the entire country must be part of a common structure and a general organization for national reconstruction and individual effort.” 22

Once the Communists assumed power over all of China in 1949, the regime started a prolonged assault on the remnants of Confucianism. Chiang was not about to embrace Liberalism in the name of resisting Communism, and he was hence a bugbear to the USA. Chiang stated: “It should be noted that China’s democratic system will certainly not be patterned on the nineteenth-century democratic theories of individualism and class consciousness of Europe and America.” 23 This rampant individualism Chiang rejected for China, writing “we must never permit individual interests to interfere with the common interest of the state, nor allow individual ‘freedom’ to encroach upon the ‘freedom’ of others.” The rule of law would be upheld as the means by which China would become “a solidly organized body of national defense…” 24

The San Min Chu-I Youth Corps was created, “to serve the urgent needs of the youth of the country, to open a new life for the Kuomintang, and to serve as the source of a new motivating force for the Chinese nation.” 25 The Youth Corps went into the villages and assisted with harvests and other menial labor. The high motives that Chiang had for the importance of the Youth Corps, like much else, were not fulfilled and the youth wing was absorbed into the party in 1947. However, in 1952 a Youth Corps was revived in Taiwan under the direct inspiration of Chiang, with his son Chiang Ching-kuo assuming an able leadership. The Youth Corps became the vanguard of the Kuomintang social and cultural reforms on Taiwan. Its stated purpose was to form youth of strong physique, instilling a military and physical training in the young, and a national revolutionary ethos. The Youth Corps had its own radio station, “Young Lion,” journal, and publishing company. The Youth Corps also provided many welfare benefits to students, helped with labor and harvesting, and was well regarded by both students and parents.

Third Way Economics

Chiang readily stated that the Nationalist Revolution had fallen far-short of its goals, encumbered by the foreign concessionaires, war lords, civil war, the Communist Party, and Japanese invasion. China’s economists were preoccupied with either Liberalism or Communism. The Liberals sought to apply the theories of the West’s industrial revolution to China.

Chiang acknowledged that the real work of economic reconstruction did not really get started. However, from 1927, with Chiang’s victory over the warlords, significant achievements were made in highway and railway construction, telephone and telegraph, and domestic and foreign debts were revised. 27

Of particular significance was the state takeover of private banks in 1935, although Chiang does not detail this important development. State currency was issued, but the war with Japan and then with the Communists caused problems with hyperinflation. However the issue of state currency does show that the Nationalist state was attempting to adopt the most crucial element for a people’s sovereignty - its own currency and credit. China’s currency had been based on silver, which was manipulated by foreign banks and caused major instability, in addition to the colossal smuggling operations of silver out of China by Japanese, which was then sold on the London market. The result was major deflation. The Chinese Government at first felt it had no recourse but to peg the currency to the U.S. dollar, which one might surmise was the aim of the manipulations by the USA of silver. Instead silver was nationalized, and through the Central Bank of China the state assume control of finance.

Jii Zhaojin describes the banking reform as the result of “an accident that involved various conflicting interests with foreign powers and world finance,” which gave the Government the chance to “change its domestic monetary base.” Before the war with Japan in 1937 the Nationalists had established “a relatively strong central banking system.” 28 Sir Frederick Lieth-Ross, sent by Britain to Shanghai to examine the banking situation, commented that it was “an inconvertible managed currency on the basis of their own resources.” 29 Jii comments that Chiang gained the hostility of Chinese bankers due to the reforms, which is unsurprising and hardly puts him in a class of lackeys of capitalism. Jii states that the reforms led to an “economic boom.” During the war the state assumed control of foreign exchange, and implemented barter in trade. 30

Republic of China: Nationalist Outpost

With the withdrawal to Taiwan following the defeat of the Nationalist Army by the Reds in 1949, there was not much about the Republic of China that would endear itself to US interests, despite its being a citadel of anti-communism. The USA’s typically duplicitous two-China policy enabled Taiwan to be kicked out of the United Nations Organization and replaced by Red China, while making it look as though the US had remained loyal to ROC. 31

There were disagreements on the course to follow in regard to market economics or a command economy, and the extent to which either should be followed. The KMT policy laid down by Sun Yat-sen had counselled that the state keep private interests in check, and the KMT administration that took over from the Japanese in 1945 followed a radical course with difficulty, there being resistance from those who wanted a privatized economy. With the inherent problems of a small home market, as early as 1950 a barter agreement had been reached between Taiwan and Japan which laid a basis for economic revival for both nations. 32 Funds were provided for state enterprises in the electrical, chemical fertilizer and cotton textile industries. Although these funds were not state credit but drawn from U.S. loans, which meant an inherent flaw in developing a sovereign economy, innovative techniques included state directed barter of rice for fertilizer, albeit efforts to extend this to other industries were unsuccessful.

Import, foreign exchange and licensing controls aimed to expand the home market and secure economic self-sufficiency. When the economy expanded exports this again was under state direction, and included export quotas, and limiting foreign control. However, Taiwan was not an export-led economy. In 1969 only 16.7% of the work force were employed in export production. That is to say, the much vaunted market economy, claimed as the basis for Taiwan’s “economic miracle,” did not exist. The state did not relent on its resistance to foreign investment until the export boom of the late 1960s. A 1979 paper, questioning the claim that Taiwan had become an economic success by reason of market economics, states of the KMT government that it “cannot be said to have delivered Taiwan into foreign hands, either by letting merchant capital dominate foreign trade or by letting monopoly capital dominate manufacturing. Key manufacturing sectors remain wholly or partly in state hands.” 33


Chinese Civilization was old and had decayed and renewed many times over when the Western Civilization was still young. The Nationalist Revolution was an attempt to regenerate China. The ROC was a last heroic effort for Chinese Civilization to return to its path as a unique culture-organism. Today, Taiwan assumes its place a part of a world economy run by plutocrats. “When the world experienced the end of the cold war in 1991, Taiwan entered the new era of internationalization and globalization.” 34 As for Chiang, he had remained true to his nationalist-revolutionary principles which could have built a very different China had that destiny not be thwarted by U.S.-based interests, using the same duplicitous tactics that had brought the demise of the White Armies during the Russian Civil War; 35 later of Batista and Samoza; and in our own era the fall of a string of regimes across North Africa and Europe.

  1. Joseph R McCarthy, America’s Retreat from Victory ([1951] Boston: Western Islands, 1965).

  2. John T Flynn’s While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and who made it ([1951] Boston: Western Islands, 1965).

  3. Jun Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Untold Story (London: Jonathan Cape 2005), 304-311. The chapter is titled “Saved by Washington.”

  4. “Sun Li-jen”, Obituary, New York Times, November 21, 1990,

  5. Central Intelligence Bulletin, August 2 1955,

  6. Jim Mann, “Taiwan Thriving Four Decades After CIA Predicted Its Fall”, Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1993,

  7. Jim Mann, ibid.

  8. Ibid.

  9. Bolton, Revolution from Above (London, 2011), 42-47.

  10. K R Bolton, “China and the Mandate of Heaven,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 2016; pp. 67.

  11. Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory (New York, 1947), 42.

  12. Ibid., 93-94.

  13. Ibid., China’s Destiny, 96-97.

  14. Amaury de Riencourt, The Soul of China (1958 Honeyglen Publishing, 1989), 139-146.

  15. Chiang Kai-shek, op. cit., 97.

  16. Ibid., 98.

  17. Ibid., 100.

  18. Ibid., 92.

  19. Ibid., 93.

  20. Ibid., 121.

  21. Ibid., 214.

  22. Ibid., 213.

  23. Ibid., 169.

  24. Ibid., 213.

  25. Ibid., 216.

  26. “Youth Corps Rules and Regulations,” Section 1: Our Purposes.

  27. Chiang Kai-shek, op. cit., 127.

  28. Ji Zhaojin, A History of Modern Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline of China’s Finance Capitalism (Routledge, 2016), “The 1935 Currency Reform.” See also : Noah Elbot, “China’s 1935 Currency Reform: A Nascent success cut short,”

  29. Ibid., “The British Response.”

  30. Ibid., “Foreign Exchange Management.”

  31. Bolton, Revolution from Above, op. cit., 43-44.

  32. Tai-Chun Kuo and Ramon Hawley Myers, Taiwan’s Economic Transformation (New York: Routledge, 2012), 44.

  33. Alice H Amsden, “Taiwan’s Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory,” Modern China, Vol. 5, No. 3, Symposium on Taiwan: Society and Economy, July, 1979, 168.

  34. Frank S T Hsiao and Mei-Chu W Hsiao, “Taiwan in the Global Economy - Past, Present, and Future,” Taiwan in the Global Economy – From an agrarian economy to an exporter of high-tech products, Peter Chow, ed., (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers), 2001.

  35. Bolton, Revolution from Above, op. cit., 66-97.